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Observing Participating Observation –  
A Re-description Based on Systems Theory 
Tina Bering Keiding  
Abstract: »Beobachtung von teilnehmender Beobachtung: Eine systemtheore-
tisch basierte Re-Deskription«. Current methodology concerning participating 
observation in general leaves the act of observation unobserved. Approaching 
participating observation from systems theory offers fundamental new insights 
into the topic. Observation is always participation. There is no way to escape 
becoming a participant and, as such, co-producer of the observed phenomenon. 
There is no such thing as a neutral or objective description. As observation 
deals with differences and process meaning, all descriptions are re-
constructions and interpretations of the observed. Hence, the idea of neutral 
descriptions as well as the idea of the naïve observer becomes a void. Not rec-
ognizing and observing oneself as observer and co-producer of empirical data 
simply leaves the process of observation as the major unobserved absorber of 
contingency in data production based on participating observation. 
Keywords: participating observation; systems theory; observing observers; 
meaning. 
1. Setting the Scene 
From 2007 to 2009, three research conferences were held about the methodolo-
gies of systems theory1. However, only a single contribution addressed the 
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methodology of in situ interaction studies. This contribution concerned educa-
tional research and argued that in situ studies are fundamental for the produc-
tion of knowledge about the processes of teaching and learning (KEIDING & 
KRUSE, 2008). Educational studies often delimit themselves to descriptions of 
conditions, learning outcomes or participants’ experiences (e.g., KLETTE 
2007, 2008). However, what one roughly might call “input and output studies” 
leave the fundamental processes of teaching and learning unobserved. Conse-
quently educational research has brought itself into a situation in which teach-
ing as interaction is often handled as a huge “black-box.”. From this position, 
educational research might be able to answer questions on “what works” but is 
unable to understand “how it works.” 
The relevance of in situ studies is not delimited to educational research but 
has relevance for many topics in social science as well as the humanities. Tak-
ing this into account, this contribution addresses how in situ observation studies 
in general can be understood and conceptualized through Niklas LUHMANN’s 
systems theory. 
In situ observations as observations where the observer observes interaction 
by being present as interaction emerges is familiar from anthropology, ethnog-
raphy, social science and psychology – often, under the label “participating 
observation” (e.g. BERNARD, 1998; CRANO & BREWER, 2002; HAM-
MERSLEY, 2006; HEDEGAARD, 1984; HOWITT & CRAMER, 2005; 
LANGDRIDGE, 2004; LINDLOF, 1995; SANJEK, 1990; WADEL, 1991). 
However, current reflections on methods and techniques for participating ob-
servation are either incompatible with or inadequate from a systems theoretical 
approach. 
The paper will concentrate on four subjects: namely, the concepts of obser-
vation and participation, the concept of meaning, and note-taking. To avoid 
general theoretical descriptions, the concepts of systems theory in general are 
introduced successively as they emerge in the text. 
2. Participation and Observation 
“Participating observation” connects the two phenomena “observation” and 
“participation.” They are often opposed for the construction of a range of types 
of participating observation – for instance, “pure observation” versus “pure 
participation” (DEWALT, DEWALT & WAYLAND, 1998, p.262) or “com-
plete participation” versus “complete observation” (LINDLOF, 1995, pp.141-
149). This habit indirectly describes observation and participation as events, 
which can be separated from one another. 
According to Niklas LUHMANN, the key phrase regarding interaction sys-
tems is “der Wahrnehmung des Wahrgenommenwerdens” (LUHMANN, 
2002a, p.56). It might be translated as “perception of being perceived” and 
underlines that participating in interaction is tightly intertwined with mutual 
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experiences of being perceived. When one as an individual connects to or en-
gages in interaction, one becomes aware that one is observed and perceived by 
other participants. Participation does not mean that one has to contribute to 
communication by expressing oneself. Just being present makes one as partici-
pant: “In practice, one cannot not communicate in an interaction system; one 
must withdraw if one wants to avoid communication” (LUHMANN, 1995a, 
p.413). 
The terms participation and participating in communication might lead us to 
forget that social systems consist of communication and that human individu-
als, according to Niklas LUHMANN (e.g. 1995a, pp.210f.), belong to the envi-
ronment of social systems. Accordingly, participation in this context does not 
mean “being part of” in the sense of included or integrated in. To participate 
means to contribute to social interaction by providing the structural complexity 
of one’s psychic system for the communication’s selection of information, 
utterance and understanding and to expose one psychic system to communica-
tion, thereby allowing communication and actions to stimulate new thoughts 
and impressions, which produce new points of departures for the process of 
observation (e.g. LUHMANN, 2002b). 
Utterance of information can be attributed to human beings, who thereby en-
ter communication as persons (LUHMANN, 1995a, p.210; 1995b). Attribution 
allows social identification. Nevertheless, all communicative events refer to 
communication, not to the human individuals:  
Observers can predict action better by knowing a situation than by knowing 
people, and correspondingly, their observation of action often, if not always, is 
not concerned with the mental state of the actor, but with carrying out the au-
topoietic reproduction of the social system. Nevertheless, everyday action is 
attributed to individuals. Such extremely unrealistic behavior can only be ex-
plained by a need to reduce complexity (LUHMANN, 1995a, p.166).  
As regards participating observation, this means that the observer is co-
producer of the observed interaction and that, when he or she attributes com-
municative events and actions to observed individuals, he or she omits to ob-
serve that meaning refers to the situation and the specific interaction rather than 
to single individuals, who might behave completely differently in a similar 
situation. A student might appear unengaged in one lesson and very active in a 
subsequent lesson. That the actions of observed persons refer to and must be 
interpreted with the social system as point of reference does not only apply to 
the observation of systems that count more persons than the observer and the 
observed. Also in systems in which the observer observes how a single person 
interacts with objects, it must be taken into consideration that actions take place 
and refer to a social system. One might even consider whether the experience 
of being observed in this case is more present and has stronger influence on the 
observed than in social systems with several participants. 
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Attribution of human beings to the environment of social systems has pro-
duced strong reactions and accusations of “anti-humanism.” This discussion 
falls outside the scope of this contribution but is addressed in Tina B. KEID-
ING (2005, pp.115f.). However, a few lines should be spent on Niklas 
LUHMANN’s own reply to the critique:  
If one views human beings as part of the environment of society (instead of as 
part of society itself), this changes the premises of all the traditional questions, 
including those of classical humanism. It does not mean that the being is esti-
mated as less important than traditionally. Anyone who thinks so (and such an 
understanding either explicitly or implicitly underlies all polemics against this 
proposal) has not understood the paradigm change in systems theory (LUH-
MANN, 1995a, p.212). 
Consequently, participating observation should not be considered from the 
difference participating/observing but rather from a perspective of how the 
observer participates – for instance, expressed in terms of involvement. An 
observer engaging in discussions, asking questions, etc., exposes him- or her-
self to a different complexity and, consequently, challenges his or her opportu-
nities for moments for programmatic self-observation in different ways than an 
observer participating solely as addressee. On the other hand, direct involve-
ment produces opportunities to test understandings and meaning attribution. 
The matter of involvement is not unambiguous, nor can it be decided at a 
general level. It is a question that must be answered in each specific case by 
weighing opportunities and challenges against each other and must be ad-
dressed explicitly to create transparency – at least, at the level of programs for 
and reflections on observation. In situ, there is no privileged vantage point from 
which interaction can be observed without becoming a part of it. The observer 
is, for better or worse, thrown into interaction and a co-producer of the research 
object. 
One might question whether observation of video- or audio-recorded inter-
action should be considered as interaction. The observer and the observed do 
not perceive each other directly. But the observed might still be aware that they 
are observed, and the observer definitely becomes co-producer of meaning 
when he or she observes the recordings. Not in situ but displaced in time and 
place; in a different context. There is no simple method to choose one approach 
over another. Advantages and disadvantages must be observed, which forces 
the observer to observe how he or she observes the observed observers’ obser-
vations.  
2.1 From Person to Personality 
Participating in and observing communication implies construction of “the 
other,” a topic that Niklas LUHMANN only addresses sporadically. He distin-
guishes between persons and human individuals and uses the word “person” to 
“indicate the social identification of a complex of expectations directed toward 
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an individual human being” (LUHMANN, 1995a, p.210). The distinction be-
tween person and human individual addresses a logical consequence of the 
theory’s description of social and psychic systems as functionally closed and an 
environment for each other. An observer can only observe communication, acts 
and physical phenomena. He or she has no access to what other participants as 
humans individuals mean, think or feel, including no access to their motives 
and reasons. 
Construction of a person initially draws on the bodily and physical appear-
ance and only later on experiences with and expectations for the person as 
participant in communication (LUHMANN, 1995b). Drawing on a few obser-
vations, interaction actualizes a horizon of expectations and allocated meaning-
ful utterances and understanding. Metaphorically, one might say that a pattern 
of expectations – and thereby a person – is constructed in the light of few con-
text markers. Pattern construction and pattern recognition is a key topic in 
Gregory BATESON’s (2000, pp.292f.) theory of learning categories in which 
he uses the term “context markers” to designate observations, which interpret 
the context from a few elements. This has significant implications for partici-
pating observation: It indicates that observers from the very beginning of their 
observations, based on a few and, most likely, unobserved observations, actual-
ize specific expectations about the participants and the interaction. Expecta-
tions may, of course, later be proven wrong, but initially they actualize specific 
horizons of meaning, even in cases in which the observer decides to avoid 
immediate and spontaneous interpretations. A hardcore “open mind approach” 
is, from this perspective, nothing but explicit self-blinding. 
Repeated observations of specific utterances or acts from specific partici-
pants tend to construct a pattern of expectations, a pattern that is easily attrib-
uted to the person as “personality” (pp.297-298). These patterns of expectations 
are efficient reducers of complexity, because they indicate what to expect when 
the same human person is observed in a new context. Attribution introduces a 
potential lack of sensitivity regarding the possibility that a human individual 
appears as different persons, i.e. assume different roles in different contexts. As 
Gregory BATESON (1991, p.137) says, it is always possible to observe in such 
a way that one’s expectations are confirmed. 
Observing in a way that does not take first impressions as the full picture but 
challenges them by seeking other descriptions and interpretation takes time and 
must be weighed against data lost by leaving parts of the ongoing interaction 
unobserved. Furthermore, impressions and expectations cannot be observed as 
a whole. Only what is observed as first impression – not the impression as 
whole – can be submitted to second-order observation. 
Reduction of complexity from construction of behavioral patterns and attri-
bution of personality cannot be avoided, nor can its possible and, to some ex-
tent, unobservable influence on observation. Nevertheless or, perhaps, because 
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of this, the topic must be recognized as a condition for participating observa-
tion rather than stand unobserved or silenced. 
3. Observing the Concept of Observation  
The concept of observation could be expected to play a crucial role in the cur-
rent methodology of participating observation. And, to some extent, it does. 
Karl WEICK (1985, p.569), for instance, talks about observation as follows:  
Regarding the observation process, systematic observation makes self-
conscious and full, clearly expressed notation on how the observation is done, 
goes about the observation activity in an alert manner that allows for tactical 
improvisations, imparts attention to objects in ways that in some sense are 
standardized, yet individually trained. 
Current methodology generally addresses participating observation by “asking 
from” the concept. The term “asking from” expresses that methodology takes 
the concept of observation for granted and mainly addresses how participating 
observation can be carried out. Reflections on what an observation “is” are 
rarely found. The absence of this type of question leaves the mere act of obser-
vation as a “black box” and the major “absorber of contingency” in data pro-
duction based on in situ studies. 
3.1 Observation and Reality 
Two different understandings of the relation between phenomenon, reality and 
observation can be identified. One position defines descriptions as “close re-
flections of the world,” whereas the other defines descriptions as “creation of 
the world” (SANJEK, 1990, p.15). The first indicates an epistemological ap-
proach similar to direct realism: What you observe is what happens. 
The other indicates some kind of constructivist approach. However, it 
should not be confused with the constructivist epistemology in the tradition 
represented by Gregory BATESON (2000, Heinz von FOERSTER (1985), 
Niklas LUHMANN (1988) and Humberto MATURANA and Francisco 
VARELA (1980). Rather, it seems to refer to a pragmatic statement that, as a 
consequence of a high complexity in the surroundings compared to the limited 
complexity the observer can handle in data production, observations must be 
conducted with a focused and disciplined glance. 
Accordingly, the two main positions seem to differ primarily in whether ob-
servation captures the world as a whole or creates the world by extracting se-
lected segments. In other words, their epistemology differs mainly with respect 
to the degree of re-presentation. 
Niklas LUHMANN sees observation as a unity of the two events distinction 
and observation: “Observing means making a distinction and indicating one 
side (and not the other side) of the distinction” (2002c, p.85). 
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This approach must not be confused with the ideas of focused and disci-
plined observation. For Niklas LUHMANN, re-construction is not solely a 
question of extraction of specific segments. Rather, the object or phenomenon 
itself becomes a construction. We do not see an object as it is; we see the object 
as it emerges through the specific distinction used in the act of observation. 
Different observers may observe the same object – for instance, a specific car – 
and yet observe different cars – for instance, as a signifier of social class, as a 
threat to the environment, as a toy or as a practical object for transportation, 
depending on the distinctions used in observation. Correspondingly, human 
individuals and social interaction are not observed as they are but are shaped or 
created through the selected distinction. 
This is also well-known from Alfred KORZYBISK’s famous saying: “The 
map is not the territory” (e.g., BATESON, 2000, pp.455f.). However, it is 
further radicalized by LUHMANN, who claims that an observer has no access 
to or knowledge about the territory as it is. Everything we know is a product of 
observation and refers to the observation, not to the observed. This position can 
be recognized in Heinz von FOERSTER’s statement: “I disagree with Gregory 
Bateson. I say the map is the territory” (in SCHILLING, 1997, p.28). 
Niklas LUHMANN (2002d, p.136) does not call the reality of the external 
world into doubt. Nonetheless, knowledge about the external world refers to 
the observing system and finds no correlates in the environment of the system. 
Consequently, Niklas LUHMANN (p.132) talks about the de-ontologization of 
reality. That something appears to be real does not mean that there is something 
that correlates with the observation. Reality is, as Niklas LUHMANN puts it, 
the result of tests of consistency (1997, p.102). 
The epistemology in Niklas LUHMANN’s systems theory puts a strong fo-
cus on the participant observer as observer, i.e. on the differences though which 
he or she produces, or should one say invents, empirical reality. 
3.2 Observation and‚ Observations of Observations 
As mentioned, Niklas LUHMANN describes observation as an operation that 
consists of two events: distinction, in which the world is split into a marked and 
unmarked space, and indication, in which the marked side is named 
(LUHMANN, 2002c; 2002e). 
According to Niklas LUHMANN and George SPENCER-BROWN, differ-
ences do not exist in the environment. As Niklas LUHMANN puts it, the world 
does not demand to be observed in a specific way. Differences are not given by 
the world ahead of the act of observation but forced on it by an observer. This 
does not mean that the environment does not influence what can be observed. It 
may contain what Niklas LUHMANN (1988, p.41) calls “discontinuities,” 
which may attract the attention of the observer. Or as George SPENCER-
BROWN (1969, p.1) says: “contents are seen to differ in value.” 
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In the operation of observation, only the indicated, the inner side of the dis-
tinction, is revealed. While observing, the observer can neither observe the 
unmarked space nor the difference used in the construction of reality: “Obser-
vation has to operate unobserved to be able to cut up the world” (LUHMANN, 
2002c, p.87). An observation that designates a student as skilled cannot simul-
taneously observe that it uses the distinction skilled/unskilled, nor what it can-
not see in using this difference, or that another difference will produce different 
information about the observed object. Niklas LUHMANN (e.g., 2002d, p.136) 
talks about the difference as the blind spot of the observation and about the 
observer as “the excluded middle of his observation” (LUHMANN, 2002f, 
p.190). As regards the latter, the original text uses the phrase “der Beobachter 
ist das ausgeschlossende Dritte seiner Beobachtung” (LUHMANN, 1990, 
p.231) or directly translated “the observer is the excluded third of his or her 
observation.” 
Consequently, there is no such thing as an objective or neutral observation. 
That something is designated as an objective fact simply refers to the circum-
stance that various observers agree on what is observed and that differences 
among observers can thus be ignored (LUHMANN, 2002d, p.136; 
LUHMANN, 2002f, p.188). Objectivity in this perspective guarantees no cor-
respondence between observation and object but indicates that observations 
have been socially proven to whatever standards the specific social system 
takes into account. 
However, observations can observe previous observations and the differ-
ences used by them. Niklas LUHMANN (2002e) calls observations that ob-
serve observations “second-order observations.” Hence, a demand to observe 
the observer seems to be a crucial dimension in observation methods. 
3.3 Who is the Observer?  
Perhaps, one of Niklas LUHMANN’s most striking utterances about the rele-
vance of second-order observations is found in his reflections on dysfunctional 
communication in families: “But if one wants to know what is “pathological,” 
one must observe the observer who uses this description, not that which is 
described” (LUHMANN, 1995c, p.89; my translation). Dysfunctional commu-
nication is not something which “is” but something that comes into being when 
communication is observed through the difference dysfunctional – well-
functioning, and specific communicative events are subsequently attributed to 
the inner side. And, accordingly, dysfunctionality – and descriptions in general 
– refer to the observer, not to the observed. 
According to Niklas LUHMANN (2002f, p.190), the observer does not exist 
ahead of the observation but emerges from the mere act of observation. A sys-
tem becomes an observer through the distinction used in the act of observation. 
Any system or individual might observe an endless number objects and phe-
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nomena, just as several systems may construct similar observations. Conse-
quently, the first cannot with plausibility be explained by referring to the latter. 
Attributing an event to a specific individual/system rather than to the act of 
observation may, of course, reduce complexity for the second-order observer 
but does not produce further information about the observed. Hence, observing 
the observer does not mean to observe simply who the observer is and what is 
observed but to observe how a given observation was carried out:  
The usual understanding of the observation of observations focuses above all 
on what an observer observes (distinguishing thereby between subject and ob-
ject, but concentrates above all on the object). Constructivism describes an ob-
servation of observation that concentrates on how the observed observer ob-
serves [...] by this means one can also observe what and how an observed 
observer is unable to observe. In this case one is interested in his blind spot, 
that is, the means by which things become visible or non-visible (LUH-
MANN, 2002d, p.140). 
Observations observing previous observations can be designated second-order 
observations (e.g. LUHMANN, 2002e). Second-order observations do not 
bring the second-order observer closer to the object. They cannot claim any 
privileged position; they do not offer what Niklas LUHMANN (2002d, p.141) 
designates a “holier-than-thou” perspective. A second-order observation is like 
any other observation bound to the difference used to observe observation and 
to the fact that another difference would have led to another observation of the 
observed observation. Accordingly, second-order observations do not bring the 
observer closer to the object but allow for observation of how cognitive reality 
became visible, came into being. 
4. Observation Is Interpretation –  
The Ongoing Production of Meaning  
The term “meaning” has so far denoted that observations produce meaning and 
that there are no such things as neutral observations. This section will concen-
trate further on the production of meaning and on what I will call “the myth of 
the naïve observer.” 
Social and psychic systems process meaning. Meaning is, according to Nik-
las LUHMANN, a very abstract concept:  
The phenomenon of meaning appears as a surplus of references to other pos-
sibilities of experience and action. Something stands in the focal point, at the 
center of the intention, and all else is indicated marginally as the horizon of an 
“and so forth” of experience and action (LUHMANN, 1995a, p.60). 
Meaning in this sense becomes the unity of the difference “between what is 
actually given and what can possibly result from it” (p.74). Meaning is consti-
tuted in three dimensions: the fact dimension, the temporal dimension and the 
social dimension (pp.76-81). The three dimensions emerge intertwined but can 
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be analyzed separately – for instance, when observing how the same utterance 
seems to produce different horizons of meaning when uttered by different 
persons and/or at different times. 
For systems operating in meaning, there are no alternatives to meaning:  
Not all systems process complexity and self-reference in the form of meaning; 
but for those that do, it is the only possibility. Meaning becomes for them the 
form of the world and consequently overlaps the difference between system 
and environment (p.61). 
Meaning is the form of the world. It recursively draws on structures developed 
in the past and sketches out a horizon for possible interpretations and future. 
Due to this circularity, there is no way for an observing system to escape the 
past’s influence on the fluctuating horizon of meaning that emerges and disap-
pears as observations take place; a horizon which is never endlessly open, 
never completely determined. As participant, the observer is enrolled in the 
production of meaning. 
Current methodology seems – although conceptualized differently – to some 
extent to be aware of the circularity by which meaning simultaneously refers to 
something previous and produces new meaning. At least, a request to be aware 
of and, at best, to get rid of preconceived notions and expectations is quite 
common (e.g. DEWALT et al., 1998, p.288); whereas Cato WADEL (1991, 
p.59) says that the observer must act as a sociologist on him- or herself. 
Some approaches in anthropology emphasize the so-called “naïve observer” 
as an ideal for the observer’s approach in participating observation. The idea 
seems to be that the observer, in order to understand the observed on its own 
conditions, must avoid forcing his or her cultural categories onto the observed 
(e.g. ANGUERA-ARGILAGA, 1979, p.451; WADEL, 1991, p.27). 
Max GLUCKMANN (2007), on the other hand, questions the notion of self-
attributed naivety. William D. CRANO and Marilynn B. BREWER (2002), 
Kathleen M. DEWALT et al. (1998) and Cato WADEL (1991) also express 
reservations about how much the observer can “put him- or herself aside.” 
As an example of naïve observation, i.e. observation without drawing on 
“fixed” categories, Cato WADEL describes how a friend from the United 
States, who is unfamiliar with soccer but knows football, could describe the 
first five minutes of a soccer match.  
Several men, some dressed in red, some in blue, run into the arena. I count 22. 
I also count 10 red and 10 blue, and two who are dressed in green. All of them 
have a number on their back. The two men in green have the number 1. They 
take up position at a goal at each end of the field. The other men run about 
(1991, p.80; my translation). 
This might seem like a naïve observer’s description of social behavior. How-
ever, observation of these “naïve observations” reveal that previous horizons of 
meaning tend to reproduce themselves behind the back of the naïve observer. 
 116
Is it, for instance, likely that the term “goal” but not “player” will appear as 
notions for a naïve observer familiar with football? Would even a very naïve 
observer say that “the men run about” rather than they kick the ball to each 
other? 
Of course, these objections reflect the horizon of meaning that opens to me 
while I observe Cato WADEL’s observations. This, however, confirms rather 
than contradicts the theoretical premise that the production of system-specific 
meaning is unavoidable and that observations say more about the observer than 
about the observed. 
The production of meaning cannot be escaped by describing “pure” behav-
ior. Firstly, behavioral descriptions also use categories. Run is, for instance, a 
very condensed description of a countless number of actions; secondly, the 
term “runs” in itself produces another meaning than, for instance, “moves 
around,” “walks” or “hurries.” To run means something specific. What it 
means depends on the specific interaction system, on the context. 
5. Programs for Observation 
Niklas LUHMANN (1995a, p.317) describes a program as “a complex of con-
ditions for the correctness (and thus for social acceptability) of behavior.” As 
regard in situ observation, programs contain conditions for the observation 
process. Programs can be more or less detailed but will always be general and, 
in this sense, abstract descriptions of a forthcoming or carried-through course 
of observation. Accordingly, a program can be applied on a number of concrete 
courses of observation. Even a retrospective description will be abstract and 
describe the course of observation in categories and patterns rather than spe-
cific episodes. Programs can be further specified in plans, but even plans must 
be seen as abstractions of interaction. 
Reflections on and programs for participating observation are frequent in 
current methodological literature and concern a variety of aspects of the disci-
pline, such as the role of the observer, the degree of participation, social rela-
tions, gender and note-taking (e.g. BERNARD, 1998; CRANO & BREWER, 
2002; HAMMERSLEY, 2006; HEDEGAARD, 1984; HOWITT & CRAMER, 
2005; LANGDRIDGE, 2004; LINDLOF, 1995; SANJEK, 1990; WADEL, 
1991). 
Regarding programs for observation, Roger SANJEK (1990, pp.385-418) 
talks about the three canons of participating observation called “theoretical 
candor,” the “ethnographer’s path” and “field note evidence.” His point is that 
the observer must be aware of what he or she is looking for in order to “avoid 
opportunistic study of everything” (SANJEK, 1990, p.398). 
However, as mentioned in the previous section, another position can be 
found. It claims that the observer must enter observation with “an open mind” 
to avoid forcing preconceived notions and concepts on interaction. 
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This approach is highly incompatible with the demand of transparency that 
seems to be an utmost necessity with an approach based on Niklas 
LUHMANN’s systems theory. The incompatibility does not relate to cognitive 
openness but to transparency and the fact that entering observations without a 
disciplined glance makes what is observed completely random. Or as Roger 
SANJEK (1990, p.398) puts it: Allows for an opportunistic study of everything. 
Something will attract the observer’s attention, produce meaning and frame 
future observations, but what attracts the attention is unpredictable and, to 
some extent, unobservable. 
One of the more spectacular descriptions of this approach is found in David 
LIPSET’s description of the young Gregory BATESON’s first anthropological 
field study:  
Upon arrival, Bateson began measuring heads with calipers until one of the 
Baining asked why he was doing it. This so confused him that he was unable 
to explain himself, much less formulate a response in his then meager pidgin 
English. This termination of this part of his research did not clarify what he 
ought to do instead (LIPSET, 1980, p.127). 
Roger SANJEK’s concepts of theoretical candor and the ethnographer’s path 
have parallels to three concepts that, drawing on Niklas LUHMANN, can be 
called guiding difference, system reference and point of observation. 
As the name suggests, guiding differences guide observations by creating a 
glance – a form – through which interaction is observed. They indicate what 
the observer is observing or is “looking for.” In classroom research, a guiding 
difference could be “teacher-student feedback.” Observing classroom interac-
tion from this perspective will most likely produce another story about interac-
tion than, for instance, the guiding difference “student-student interaction” or 
“exclusion.” In this sense, guiding differences reduce complexity for the ob-
server by indicating which episodes or events in the continuous stream of 
events the observer’s awareness should be directed towards. Along with formu-
lation of guiding differences, conditions for indication must be settled, i.e. 
under which conditions does a communicative event belong to the inner side of 
the guiding difference? In more common terms: How does one recognize, for 
instance, feedback; when is a communicative event designated as “feedback;” 
when is it merely a question or a response?  
Interaction has no inherent meaning. Episodes or events become what they 
become depending on the observer’s system reference. System reference ex-
presses the coding or conditioning of interaction from which single episodes 
gain meaning. Interaction and episodes will, for instance, emerge differently to 
the observer if observed from an educational point of view than if friendship, 
the economy or power is chosen as system reference. Answering a question 
with a counter question might appear to be impolite with friendship as system 
reference but as professional feedback if education is chosen as system refer-
ence. Certainty about the participating observer’s system reference, in other 
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words, contributes to transparency concerning from where, i.e. from which 
perspective, interaction is observed. 
A third concept in programs for observation can be called “point of observa-
tion.” It puts the focus on whose observations the participating observer ob-
serves. The current methodology of participating observation seems without 
exception to understand social interaction with human individuals as the point 
of reference, thus attributing social events (communication and actions) to 
single individuals. However, through his concept of social systems, Niklas 
LUHMANN offers unique opportunities to observe interaction as self-referring 
communication, describing how communication evolves, how and when 
themes emerge and fade away, how participants take part and redraw, etc., 
without reducing the dynamics of communication to acts and behavior of single 
individuals. 
The attempt to understand interaction as interaction is also a key topic in 
Gregory BATESON’s work and is clearly expressed through his descriptions of 
symmetrical, complementary and reciprocal relations (BATESON, 2000). 
However, he never fully succeeds in finding a way to describe interaction and 
relations without dissolving them by attributing single actions to single indi-
viduals (e.g., BATESON 2000, pp.194-227, 271-278; KEIDING & 
LAURSEN, 2005, pp.160-161). 
Observing interaction with interaction as a point of observation does not ex-
clude the possibility of focusing on selected dimensions of interaction. It could 
be specific persons or specific themes. Having interaction or selected dimen-
sions of interaction as a point of observation simply means that interaction as a 
social system is understood and explained with reference to interaction, instead 
of trying to understand it with reference to single contributions or single par-
ticipants. 
The claim for a disciplined glance should not be taken as an argument for 
stubbornness or lack of sensitivity. Of course, participating observers might 
benefit from cognitive openness, which allows for reflection on and adjustment 
of the program; but engaging in participating observation without transparency 
in the glance forced on interaction introduces a considerable randomness in 
what is observed as well as a fundamental lack of transparency and opportuni-
ties for observing the participating observer as observer. 
5.1 Thrown Into Interaction 
Programs for participating observation cannot determine in situ observation. In 
general, one must, with Niklas LUHMANN, distinguish between planning and 
interaction. 
He addresses this topic in relation to both organizations (LUHMANN, 1975, 
p.15) and the educational system: “That aims and plans play a role is not put 
into question. They help to interpret not-unambiguous situation and decide on 
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subsequent steps if redundant capacity” (LUHMANN, 2002a, p.105; my trans-
lation)2. 
This means that a prior disciplined glance produced in the program for ob-
servation only influences observations if and as long as the observer is able to 
use it as program for reflection and selection of actions. However, observation 
and reflection on observation cannot take place simultaneously. The participat-
ing observer must either observe his or her observations or observe interaction. 
In this sense, participating observation – like any other observation – either 
operates in blindness or does not take place at all. 
The difference between program and interaction must not be seen as a prob-
lem of distance (too far from/close enough to) nor a problem with the level of 
abstraction (too general/adequately specific) and can definitely not be remedied 
by the addition of details to the program, although further details, at a first 
glance, might seem to bridge the gap between programmatic abstractions and 
concrete interaction. On the contrary, the difference between program and 
process is a logical consequence of seeing interaction as a self-referential social 
system emerging with reference to itself. Using the metaphor of distance, one 
might say that the more detailed the program – i.e. the lower the level of ab-
straction – the harder it will be to reflect – and recognize – program and inter-
action in each other. 
Niklas LUHMANN expresses the same insight with regard to the gap be-
tween organizational programs and organizational interaction:  
Interaction follows its own systemic conditions and does not, or only partly, 
take organizational programs into consideration. What is organizationally ex-
pected is at the level of interaction continuously deformed or even intention-
ally sidetracked (1975, p.15; my translation)3. 
5.2 A Note on Field Notes: Transformation 
and Reduction of Complexity  
In situ observations are often fixed in text and the discipline of taking field-
notes and reflections on field notes are a key issue as regards current method-
ology on in situ observations (e.g., BERNARD, 1998; CRANO & BREWER, 
2002; LANGDRIDGE, 2004). 
Russel H. BERNARD (1998, p.270) emphasizes the significance of the sub-
ject but avoids addressing it in depth:  
                                                             
2  “Da Absichten und Pläne eine Rolle spielen, soll damit nicht bestritten sein. Sie verhelfen 
vor allem dazu, nicht-eindeutige Situationen zu interpretieren und weitere Schritte zu tun, 
wenn Kapazität dafür frei ist” 
3  “Die Interaktion folgt ihren eigenen Systemgesetzen und nimmt das Organisationspro-
gramm nicht oder nur begrenzt auf. Das organisatorisch Vorgesehene wird auf der Ebene 
der Interaktion unterlaufen, deformiert oder gar absichtlich zum Entgleisen gebracht.” 
 120
A whole chapter should be devoted to discussing strategies for writing, man-
aging, and analyzing field notes. Space limits make this impossible [...] A use-
ful maxim that we have always used in training students is that: “If you didn’t 
write it down in your field notes, then it didn’t happen (at least so far as being 
data for analysis). 
Addressing field-notes from Niklas LUHMANN’s perspective nevertheless 
reveals more fundamental questions than how to write notes. 
One must turn Russel H. BERNARD’s maxim around and ask whether 
something happened if it is written in the field notes. If notes are all that is left 
from observation and the foundation for data analysis, the answer seems to be 
“yes.” A premise that makes further reflections on field notes highly relevant. 
Observation first takes place in the observer’s psychic system and, accord-
ingly, gains the form of this system: thoughts, emotions and impressions. In 
order to fix observations in notes, the observer must first select which psychic 
events should to be fixed in field notes. Not everything observed in the psychic 
system is relevant, and not everything that is conditionally relevant can be 
fixed in notes. The gradient of complexity is always declining across the border 
between environment and system (LUHMANN, 1995a, pp.23f.). Interaction is 
more complex than the psychic system can observe, and the complexity of the 
psychic system is higher than what can be fixed in field notes. However, the 
transformation of psychic events into notes is not merely a matter of decline in 
subject-matter complexity. 
Psychic systems operate on the basis of thoughts, sensations, imagination 
(LUHMANN, 1995d, p.111). In contrast, notes are bound to forms provided by 
the language. Accordingly, note-taking includes transformation of non-
linguistic psychic elements into linguistic forms. This transformation cannot be 
seen as a “neutral” preservation of meaning from one medium to another. In 
this sense, the writing of notes must be seen as complexity-reducing processes 
that interpret and transform and, consequently, might produce new horizons of 
meaning that, due to the permanence of the notes, are likely to become all that 
is left of the evanescent interaction. In this perspective, the specific words and 
phrases used in note-taking have a strong impact on the constructed reality. 
6. Conclusion 
Approaching participating observation from systems theory and constructivism 
offers fundamental new insights into the topic. 
Observation is always participation. There is no way to escape becoming a 
participant and, as such, co-producer of the observed phenomenon. The actions 
of observed persons refer to and must be interpreted with the social system and 
its participants as points of reference. Moreover, in systems in which the ob-
server observes a single person’s interaction with objects, it must be taken into 
consideration that actions take place and refer to a social system. One might 
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even consider whether the experience of being observed in a system consisting 
only of observed and observer is more present and has stronger influence on 
the observed than in social systems with several participants. 
Consequently, the well-known opposition between participation and obser-
vation should be replaced by reflections on types of participation – for instance, 
as degrees of involvement or the advantages and disadvantages related to each 
single type of participating observation weighed in each specific case. 
Observation has to do with differences selected and forced on the observed 
environment by the observer. Different differences will produce different reali-
ties. The constructive epistemology that is a consequence of the tight coupling 
between observation and the handling of differences must not be mistaken for 
an idea of “selective re-presentation.” Observation does not selectively grasp 
the world as it is but creates an observed world. Or, in other words, invents an 
observer-dependent reality. Accordingly, there is no such thing as a neutral or 
objective description. Anything said is said by an observer. 
Social and psychic systems process meaning. Their events do not occur in a 
vacuum but draw on and produce horizons of meaning, of future actions and 
interpretation. Observed events, in other words, produce expectations for and 
the meaning of subsequent events. The observer can never escape him- or 
herself and the flavor that his or her experiences and expectations give to the 
process of observation and interpretation. Hence, the idea of neutral descrip-
tions as well as the idea of the naïve observer become a void. Not recognizing 
and observing oneself as observer and co-producer simply leaves the process of 
observation as the major unobserved absorber of contingency in data produc-
tion based on participating observation. 
Field notes cannot be understood as neutral descriptions of observation but 
are seen as a linguistic form of psychic events. The transformation from con-
sciousness into text both selects and interprets observations and creates a new 
reality. 
The main consequence of these insights is that observers must make them-
selves observable. This requires both a general theoretical framework that can 
offer descriptions sensitive to the complexity of participating observation and 
transparency in the specific process of observation. Significant contributions to 
transparency are: First, to decide what should be observed and from where 
observations should take place. Second, programs for indication: When is a 
social event relevant for the observed phenomenon? What should be included 
in the description? Third, to be aware that plans do not determine observation. 
They contribute to a disciplined glance if observed and used as a program for 
observation, but the observer cannot simultaneously observe “something” and 
observe the process of observation. He or she must continuously choose what 
to observe. Observation either observes previous observations or operates in 
blindness. 
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